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A Failed Coup on the Judicial Monarchy 
God and Man in the Law: The Foundations of Anglo-
American Constitutionalism 
by Robert Lowry Clinton   
University Press of Kansas (1997) 
I.  INTRODUCTION
“The Imperial Judiciary lives.”1 Echoing Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey, Robert Clinton’s God and Man in the Law decries the 
evils of a constitutional jurisprudence which has “effectively 
enthrone[d] the judiciary as a kind of constitutional monar-
chy.”2 God and Man in the Law attempts to debunk the legal, 
historical, philosophical, epistemological, and anti-theistic 
foundations upon which this “judicialized” constitutionalism 
rests. In its place, Clinton proposes a revival of a constitutional 
jurisprudence that presupposes a transcendent source of legal 
order in the world and is based upon the traditions of the com-
mon law. Clinton’s vision of a naturalistic jurisprudence ulti-
mately fails, however, for theoretical and practical reasons. 
Clinton contends that the heart of modern constitutional 
woes lies in the prevailing judicial supremacy on constitutional 
matters. He posits that judicial supremacy results from the 
Court’s simultaneous possession of two powers: (1) judicial fi-
nality (“the power to decide all—or nearly all—constitutional 
cases, including those that determine the constitutional 
authority of other agencies of government”)3 and (2) judicial 
freedom (“the power to select the interpretive rules according to 
 
 1. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 996 (1992) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 2. ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, GOD AND MAN IN THE LAW: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 
ANGLO-AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 22 (1997). 
 3. Id. at 54. 
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which [constitutional] cases will be decided”).4 Clinton asserts 
that “the modern fusion of judicial finality with judicial free-
dom in constitutional law . . . has no basis in traditional legal 
practice,”5 “destroys judicial accountability,”6 and results in ju-
dicial “tyranny.”7 Accordingly, the antidote to judicial suprem-
acy is to limit the Court’s power by depriving the Court of ei-
ther judicial finality or judicial freedom.8 The former 
alternative was the thesis of Clinton’s earlier work;9 the latter 
solution is the thesis of God and Man in the Law. 
Clinton articulates his argument for limiting the Court’s 
power to choose its interpretive tools as an effort to bind judges 
to “traditional interpretive rules in the decision of all constitu-
tional cases.”10 Such a traditional jurisprudence, argues Clin-
ton, is not a radical proposal intended to appeal only to reli-
gious fundamentalists;11 rather, its appeal extends to “all who 
wish to see the Constitution and its law standing upon the sur-
est possible foundation.”12 In developing this goal, Clinton 
crisscrosses the academic landscape, drawing heavily on schol-
arly thought in a variety of disciplines, including judicial poli-
tics, history, political philosophy, epistemology, metaphysics, 
and political theology.13 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 28. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. Clinton provides a cogent illustration of the potentially dictatorial nature 
of judicial supremacy as follows: “When the Court fails to achieve consensus, it risks 
falling into something approaching . . . dictatorship. For example, whenever there is a 
5-to-4 split on an important constitutional ruling, one justice effectively determines the 
social choice for all society, regardless of anyone else’s preferences.” Id. at 54. When 
viewed in this light, the modern judiciary is far from the innocuous judiciary described 
by Hamilton in Federalist No. 78. See id. at 28. 
 8. See id. at 40 (“[T]he best way to ensure judicial accountability in a constitu-
tional system governed by a nonelective judiciary is by tying judicial interpretation of 
the Constitution very closely to traditional modes of legal analysis. Alternatively, if 
traditional modes of analysis are rejected, then fidelity to our constitutional system 
requires rejection of an ultimate judicial guardianship of the Constitution.”). 
 9. See id. at 54 (referring the reader to ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. 
MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989)). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See id. at 1. 
 12. Id. at 1-2. 
 13. See id. at xi. In attempting this challenging “merger” of academic fields, it is 
clear that Clinton has been no stranger to Alexander Pope’s Pierian spring. As a con-
comitant warning, however, Clinton’s book presupposes the reader’s familiarity with a 
host of ancient and modern political thinkers, such as Plato, Aristotle, Austin, Aquinas, 
Hegel, Hobbes, Kant, J.S. Mill, Locke, Arrow, Harris, Adler, Gilson, and many others. 
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The discussion below tracks the development of Clinton’s 
defense of traditional jurisprudence, providing both a summary 
of Clinton’s major points and a critical response to his analysis. 
Part II.A discusses Clinton’s premise that the emergence of ju-
dicial hegemony in modern constitutional jurisprudence is a re-
sult of the fundamental misconception as to what a written 
constitution is. Part II.B considers the foundations of tradi-
tional jurisprudence in the social consensus of the common law 
and its societal antecedents. Part II.C attempts to capture the 
politico-philosophical underpinnings of Clinton’s traditional ju-
risprudence, and Part II.D includes some thoughts on Clinton’s 
effort to place his theory within the framework of a worldview 
that presupposes the existence of a God who imparts to man a 
legal order with transcendent structure. This Review concludes 
that while Clinton’s articulation of the problem of judicial su-
premacy on constitutional matters is accurate, his proposed 
remedy is inapplicable as a practical matter and is couched in a 
metaphysical framework that escapes serious critique due to 
its cryptic nature. 
II.  DISCUSSION 
A.  Problematic Conceptions of the Constitution 
1.  Summary 
Clinton asserts that judicial hegemony in the constitutional 
arena stems from a fundamental misconception of the Consti-
tution as merely a written “blueprint of the good society”14—“a 
written set of general guidelines,”15 which are to be translated 
into reality “under the special guardianship of particular 
‘rights-sensitive’ institutions, the courts.”16 The justification for 
such an approach seems to lie in the assumption that constitu-
tional rules were “created,” ex nihilo,17 by a “group of sociopoli-
 
This background requirement, combined with Clinton’s sometimes recondite style of 
writing, pushes the book to the edge of incomprehensibility for the lay reader and, in 
all likelihood, will send even those well-schooled in these areas to their libraries on oc-
casion. 
 14. Id. at 18 (quoting Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 394 (1985)). 
 15. CLINTON, supra note 2, at 19. 
 16. Id. at 74. 
 17. See id. at 59 (meaning, literally, “from nothing”). 
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tical elites,”18 interested in “perpetuat[ing] [their] long-term po-
litical and/or economic interests at the expense of other 
groups.”19 
Clinton argues that the “blueprint” metaphor presents a 
number of problems for constitutional jurisprudence. First, 
blueprint constitutionalism “reduces the Constitution to a 
plethora of empty words and phrases with ever-changing con-
tent . . . upon which courts or other deconstructive interpreters 
are expected to graft substantive rules and principles in order 
to keep an essentially meaningless text ‘in tune with the 
times.’ ”20 Such an approach “overemphasizes the prescriptive, 
future-oriented malleability of a constitution”21 and places con-
stitutional law essentially on the same level as any other law, 
thus suggesting that constitutional law “may be abrogated just 
as easily as any other law . . . when its provisions are found in-
convenient.”22 Furthermore, the instability of the Constitution 
under the blueprint model reinforces society’s “ ‘dependen[cy]’ 
on the omnipresent, omnicompetent federal judge”23 to reveal 
the Constitution’s true meaning. This, in turn, has led to the 
recent increase in various forms of “textualism.”24 
In contrast to the blueprint definition of the Constitution, 
Clinton asserts that a written “constitution” is more appropri-
ately conceived of as an attempt to capture “a set of fundamen-
tal precepts so widely shared as to ‘constitute’ the society over 
large stretches of time.”25 Clinton’s emphasis is on a wide, 
multi-generational consensus of political opinion in society—
i.e., tradition.26 A constitution, viewed from this perspective, 
not only imbues constitutional language with a “given”27 sub-
stantive content that logically should constrain judges engaged 
in constitutional interpretation, but also validates treating the 
Constitution as a basic governing law that binds successive 
generations and that justifies more vigilant 
 
 18. Id. at 19. 
 19. Id. at 41. 
 20. Id. at 18. 
 21. Id. at 19. 
 22. Id. at 22. 
 23. Id. at 14. 
 24. See id. at 18. 
 25. Id. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. at 20. 
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protection than less general forms of law.28 
Despite the differences between the blueprint model and 
Clinton’s definition of constitution, however, Clinton concedes 
that the Constitution is not complete in and of itself. In fact, 
Clinton asserts that “it is . . . impossible for a single writing . . . 
to capture fully the whole of society’s constitutional principles. 
At best, the provisions of a written constitution can provide an 
incomplete list of such principles and thus can be just a more or 
less adequate reflection of that society’s real constitution.”29 
This “real” constitution is the “underlying decisional pre-
dispositions of [the] polity’s citizenry,”30 which are “so widely 
acknowledged and accepted as to form a significant part of so-
ciety’s self-definition.”31 Thus, the written Constitution is only 
the “real” Constitution to the extent that the constitutional 
symbols represented by the text correspond to the underlying 
constitutional experiences that they represent.32 Viewing the 
Constitution in this way rejects a purely “textualist” approach 
to constitutional issues and requires constitutional interpreters 
to consider these underlying constitutional experiences. 
2.  Critical response 
Clinton’s discussion of “blueprint” constitutionalism admit-
tedly has strong appeal. Upon closer scrutiny, however, Clin-
ton’s polarization of blueprint adherents from traditional ad-
herents seems an overstatement at best. 
First, it is doubtful that even the most liberal constitutional 
theorists view the Constitution as “a plethora of empty words 
and phrases,”33 completely void of substantive content. On the 
contrary, even the ardent textualists not only admit, but even 
positively assert that legal texts have a “given” content, though 
they argue that the “given” meaning is inherent in the text it-
self rather than (as Clinton suggests) in the historical circum-
stances under which the text was produced.34 
 
 28. See id. at 41. 
 29. Id. at 21 (emphasis added). 
 30. Id. at 60. 
 31. Id. at 62. 
 32. See id. at 64. 
 33. Id. at 18. 
 34. Ironically, the goal of the textualists is the same as Clinton’s: to impose judi-
cial restraint in the interpretation of legal texts. See EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS 
OF LAW 259 (1994) (“Textualism’s central claimed virtue is [that] . . . it prevents fur-
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Second, even Clinton’s own view of the written Constitution 
as an attempt to embody society’s unwritten constitution rec-
ognizes that substantive content must be imposed on the text. 
Indeed, Clinton’s constitutional conception is subject to the 
same criticism he heaps upon blueprint constitutionalism—i.e., 
Clinton all but explicitly endorses the view that, without the 
substantive “help” of the common law, the Constitution is in-
deed only a “plethora of empty words and phrases.” 
Finally, the stated objective of the Constitution—“in Order 
to form a more perfect Union”35—implies that the goals of the 
Constitution were, at least to some degree, future-oriented—
i.e., “blueprints” for improving upon the existing constitution of 
society by codifying in a written constitution principles which, 
at least in some respects, were previously nonexistent.36 This 
point is illustrated by Clinton’s own example. While he enu-
merates a number of principles embodied in the Constitution 
which do in fact have historical antecedents in the common 
law,37 Clinton seems, by negative implication, to admit that 
other constitutional provisions were without common law  
antecedents. For instance, conspicuously absent from Clin- 
ton’s enumerated list are the ideas of due process and equal 
protection. 
Therefore, to carry the blueprint analogy a step further, the 
question is not whether the Constitution is or is not a blueprint 
of sorts, upon which good societal houses have been built, but 
rather what is the proper source of the materials with which to 
fill out the blueprint. For Clinton, the source is the common 
law. This approach may indeed be valuable in cases where the 
constitutional provisions at issue do in fact have clearly identi-
fiable common law antecedents. But where the common law 
basis for the clauses is less conspicuous (or nonexistent), Clin-
 
thering mere judicial intent. The textualist’s central fear is that judges will impose 
their own views of sound policy under the guise of having discovered a subtly hidden 
legislative intent in the legislative history or purpose.”). 
 35. U.S. CONST. preamble (emphasis added). 
 36. Professor Laurence Tribe describes such future-oriented provisions in the 
Constitution as “aspirational.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (Com-
ment by Laurence Tribe appearing in the same publication) 87-88 (1997) (stating that 
while “some [constitutional] provisions refer quite pointedly to preserving past prac-
tices, . . . others are more plausibly read as statements of aspiration [which] the au-
thors or ratifiers wished to make binding on their representatives into the indefinite 
future even if extant practices would have to be substantially revised in order to 
achieve that end”). 
 37. See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
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ton’s reliance on the common law may not provide adequate 
substantive content for the blueprint. 
B.  The Foundations of Social Consensus in Traditional 
Constitutional Jurisprudence 
1.  Summary 
Regarding the Constitution’s British common law roots, 
Clinton suggests that 
of the twenty-one sections making up the first four articles of 
the U.S. Constitution, at least sixteen contain one or more 
provisions that are directly traceable to English sources. 
Similarly, at least seventeen of twenty-eight provisions in the 
first eight amendments of the U.S. Constitution find their an-
cestry in the common law of England.38 
These principles, in turn, were the result of the constant refin-
ing process that took place as the common law developed 
through the decision-making of judges in individual cases. Over 
time, the principles of constitutional consensus emerged, while 
the aberrations largely snuffed themselves out. 
According to Clinton, the common law’s attempt to tie the 
law to the underlying “constitutional” principles emerging from 
the experience of people led to the formulation of various legal 
conventions and rules of interpretation,39 which, when properly 
applied, effectuated the social consensus, or “constitution” of 
society. 
A study of the development of the legal rules and conven-
tions governing constitutional interpretation begins with an 
analysis of the role of intent. Clinton discriminates among four 
different kinds of intent. First, he distinguishes subjective in-
tent (which asserts that “the proper way to understand the 
meaning of a legal text is in terms of what the makers of that 
text actually ‘had in mind’ ”)40 from objective intent (which fo-
cuses on the object of the makers’ intentions—i.e., not on what 
the authors actually had in mind, but rather on “what they 
must reasonably be presumed to have had in mind”).41 Clinton 
 
 38. CLINTON,  supra note 2, at 97. 
 39. See id. at 104-05. 
 40. Id. at 106. 
 41. Id. at 108. 
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adopts the latter as the better approach in legal interpretation, 
not only for the results it produces, but more fundamentally 
because it was the prevailing view with regard to matters of in-
tent in interpreting other legal documents at the time the Con-
stitution was written.42 
Closely tied to the subjective/objective intent distinction is 
the correlative distinction between original intent (which as-
sumes that the Constitution was created “ex nihilo (and thus a 
priori) pursuant to ‘intentions’ that plausibly may be regarded 
as ‘original’ ”)43 and remedial intent (which considers “the mis-
chiefs meant to be addressed but left intact (or addressed un-
successfully) under the old law that may be remedied either by 
enlargement or restriction under a new interpretation”).44 Clin-
ton adopts the remedial intent approach because, “[t]hough 
what [the framers] had in mind is not, and never can be, fully 
knowable, the mischiefs and remedies are.”45 
Clinton recognizes that intentions, however viewed, are 
based on preferences that are always subjective.46 Thus, in or-
der for intentions to operate as real constraints, they must be 
grounded in objective legal fictions which, by continuous appli-
cation, become legal conventions.47 Clinton argues that tradi-
tional legal conventions developed from three traditional rules 
of textual interpretation. The first of these is the plain-
meaning or literal rule, which assumes that the best indication 
of what the makers intended consists of what they wrote—i.e., 
the words themselves, “understood in their most usual and 
most known signification.”48 The plain-meaning rule also con-
tains a subjective and an objective component: the subjective 
focus is on what the words meant to the makers of the law; the 
objective focus is on the plain meaning associated with the law 
from the perspective of the reasonable man to whom the law 
applies.49 
The second rule of interpretation, subordinate to the plain-
 
 42. See id. at 109. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 110. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 111. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. at 112 (quoting Blackstone, in CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF 
MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION TO JUDGE-MADE 
LAW 18 (1986)). 
 49. See id. at 113. 
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meaning rule, is the “mischief” or “social purpose” rule.50 This 
rule, which applies only when the plain-meaning rule is inade-
quate to resolve the issue, authorizes (for interpretive pur-
poses) “reliance upon the ‘evils’ which the law was designed to 
remedy.”51 The burden under the mischief rule is to show that 
the departure suggested would have been agreed to by the 
makers of the law if they had considered the issue in the given 
context.52 
The third and final rule of interpretation is the “golden” 
rule.53 This rule is “a rule of consistency, which authorizes de-
parture from the literal interpretation even when the language 
is unambiguous, where . . . ‘the words bear either none, or a 
very absurd signification, if literally understood.’ ”54 The ab-
surdity involved must be “a matter of logic” (e.g., colliding pro-
visions in the same statute), “not merely one of policy.”55 
These traditional rules of interpretation undergird the use 
of another important legal convention which is a product of the 
common law: the principle of stare decisis or adherence to 
precedent.56 Original intent, with a focus on the objective intent 
aspect, requires consistency in the law. This need for consis-
tency finds its satisfaction in the practice of stare decisis. 
Proponents of modern constitutional theory view adherence 
to precedent as “a reactionary device designed to retard social 
progress by allowing the past to govern the present.”57 In re-
sponse, Clinton asserts that adherence to precedent does not 
shackle the present to the past; rather, it consists of “ ‘trusting 
to a consensus of common human voices rather than to some 
isolated or arbitrary record.’ ”58 Under this view, we are not 
governed by the dead, but rather “have the dead at our coun-
cils.”59 
Clinton concludes that these traditional conventions and 
rules of legal interpretation form the basis of the common law 
 
 50. See id. at 112. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See id. at 113. 
 53. See id. at 112. 
 54. Id. (quoting Blackstone, in WOLFE, supra note 48, at 19). 
 55. Id. at 112; see also id. at 114. 
 56. See id. at 119. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 16 (quoting GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 84-86 (1908)). 
 59. Id. at 119. 
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jurisprudence through which the constitutional principles of 
societal consensus have emerged over the centuries. Thus, they 
have proved, through experience, to be effective methods of ob-
taining reasoned results that comport with the basic notions of 
justice as held by society as a whole. Clinton contends that 
when the Supreme Court has relied on them in its own juris-
prudential thought, its actions have generally been validated 
over time. On the other hand, when the Court has deviated 
from these principles in the past, the results have been disas-
trous60 and will likely be so again under the current constitu-
tional jurisprudence.61 
2.  Critical response 
The central problem with Clinton’s call for the implementa-
tion of traditional conventions of textual interpretation is that 
even if the courts could be required to abide by such standards, 
there is no evidence that they would remedy the judicial su-
premacy which Clinton so vehemently opposes. An analysis of 
these rules and conventions bears this out. 
a. The plain-meaning rule. First, as Clinton admits, the con-
ventional rules of interpretation are susceptible to abuse.62 On 
the subject of plain meaning, Justice Holmes once remarked 
that “[a] word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged; it is 
the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and 
content according to the circumstances and the time in which it 
is used.”63 
Indeed, one does not have to look very hard in a law stu-
dent’s first-year contracts text to find cases on parol evidence in 
which one judge argues vehemently that the “plain meaning” of 
a particular legal text is thus and so, while her colleague, with 
equal vigor, argues that the same language is unquestionably 
ambiguous.64 Such contradictions call into question the validity 
 
 60. See id. at 31 (citing to cases such as Dredd Scott, Plessy v. Ferguson, Lochner 
v. New York, and stating that “most (if not all) such . . . ‘bad’ decisions were founded 
upon departures from traditional interpretive rules”). 
 61. See id., at 32. 
 62. See id. at 115 (noting that misapplication of the three basic rules of interpre-
tation has resulted in the “intrusion of the private moral convictions of judges upon our 
constitutional law”); see also id. at 116 (noting that the rules of interpretation have 
been, on occasion, “questionably applied”). 
 63. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918). 
 64. The California Supreme Court summarized the problems with the plain-
meaning rule as follows: 
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of wholesale acceptance of the plain-meaning rule and support 
the view that “[a] sentence that seems to need no interpreta-
tion is already the product of one.”65 Moreover, it seems ironic 
that Clinton would advocate the plain-meaning rule since its 
application, by definition, precludes an analysis of the common 
law underpinnings of supposedly “plain” constitutional text in 
all cases except those in which the plain meaning leads to logi-
cally absurd results. It would seem that Clinton’s theory would 
get more theoretical mileage from an attack on, rather than an 
endorsement of, the plain-meaning rule. Indeed, the plain-
meaning rule is the fundamental tenant of the textualist ap-
proaches which he opposes. 
b. The mischief rule. Second, the mischief rule is subject to 
similar criticism. While it can be admitted that existing his-
torical records give some indication as to the evils which the 
law was designed to remedy, the evidence of “remedial intent” 
often seems no less insulated from subjective interpretation 
than the subjective intent of those enacting the law.66 As with 
the search for subjective intent, the central problem with the 
mischief rule is that it fails to recognize that, like Congress, the 
framers “[were] a they, not an it.”67 One commentator ques-
tioned the validity of the use of “purpose” in statutory interpre-
tation as follows: 
[I]s it any more meaningful to refer to “the” purpose than it is 
to refer to “the” intent? Statutes are not the product of a sin-
gle lawmaker but of a collegial body with a rather large mem-
bership. Might not individual legislators have different, even 
 
“A word is a symbol of thought but has no arbitrary and fixed meaning like a 
symbol of algebra or chemistry, . . . .” The meaning of particular words or 
groups of words varies with the “. . . verbal context and surrounding circum-
stances and purposes . . . . A word has no meaning apart from these factors; 
much less does it have an objective meaning, one true meaning.” 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644-45 
(Cal. 1968) (citations omitted). 
 65. Stanley E. Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech 
Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other 
Special Cases, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 625, 637 (1978). 
 66. As for example, in the case where one legislator votes to enact a moment of 
silence in the public schools in order to “remedy” the absence of God from the class-
room, another legislator might vote to enact the moment of silence in order to “remedy” 
a perceived lack of student focus on their studies at the beginning of each school day. 
The fact that both legislators view the legislation as a remedy to an existing mischief 
does not make their subjective intent any more objective. 
 67. HANKS ET AL., supra note 34, at 249. 
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conflicting, purposes in mind? Suppose only a portion (a ma-
jority? a majority of the majority? a few dozens?) of the legis-
lators had a particular purpose in mind—can that be “the” 
purpose of the Act?68 
 Like statutes, the Constitution, as ultimately drafted, rep-
resented a number of compromises among the various “mis-
chiefs” the individual framers intended to remedy. Thus, resort 
to Clinton’s mischief rule seems to open rather than close  
the door to the interpolation of judicial will in constitutional  
interpretation. 
c. The golden rule. Third, Clinton’s “golden” rule is inade-
quate as a rule of judicial constraint. The golden rule only op-
erates as an exception to the plain-meaning rule when adher-
ence to the plain meaning creates a “logical” absurdity.69 Thus, 
judges are still constrained by the plain-meaning rule where its 
application results “merely” in a policy-based absurdity. Using 
Clinton’s own example, a logical absurdity exists when a stat-
ute contains conflicting provisions. The absurdity is logical 
since it would be impossible for a judge to enforce one provision 
without doing violence to the other provision. Certainly, the 
appropriateness of rejecting the plain-meaning rule under such 
circumstances is unassailable. What if, however, the absurdity 
does not require a logical violation of the statute, as in the case 
where the facts unmistakably fall within the plain meaning of 
the statute, but clearly violate “the spirit” of the statute? 
To draw upon a famous example, the court in the case of 
Riggs v. Palmer70 addressed the question of whether a grand-
son who murdered his grandfather should be allowed to inherit 
his estate under an intestate succession statute whose “plain 
meaning” required such a result. Under Clinton’s golden rule, 
the judge would be required to grant the son his inheritance,71 
 
 68. Id. at 352. 
 69. See supra, notes 53-55 and accompanying text. 
 70. 22 N.E. 188 (1889). 
 71. Indeed, some courts, adhering to Clinton’s golden rule, did in fact reach such 
a conclusion. See, for example, the (in)famous case of Deem v. Milliken, in which a 
murdering son was granted his mother’s inheritance. 6 Ohio C.C. 357 (1892), reprinted 
in HANKS ET AL., supra note 34, at 249. In arriving at this conclusion, the Deem court 
stated that “when the legislature . . . speaks in clear language upon a question of policy, 
it becomes the judicial tribunals to remain silent. . . . Judicial tribunals of the state 
have no concern with the policy of legislation.” Id. (emphasis added). Critical of such 
views, Justice Cardozo once remarked that “[j]udges march at times to pitiless conclu-
sions under the prod of a remorseless logic which is supposed to leave them no alterna-
tive. They deplore the sacrificial rite. They perform it, nonetheless, with averted gaze, 
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since the absurd result was one of “mere” policy, rather than 
logic.72 In other words, adherence to the plain meaning of the 
descent statute would not result in a logical violation of the 
statute; rather it was the policy underlying the statute which 
would be violated by strict adherence to the statute’s plain 
meaning.73 Despite Clinton’s golden rule, the Riggs court 
looked beyond the plain meaning of the statute and, by apply-
ing “maxims . . . dictated by public policy,”74 reached the unde-
niably just result of denying the grandson his inheritance. The 
justness of results achieved in the breach of the golden rule 
discredits Clinton’s reliance on the distinctions between logic 
and policy as indicators of when deviance from plain meaning 
is appropriate. 
d. The principle of stare decisis. Finally, as any student who 
has read a legal casebook can tell you, the principle of stare de-
cisis is highly malleable in the hands of a creative judge. In de-
termining the precedential value of a case, the creative judge 
may elude the constraints of stare decisis by finding (or creat-
ing) a basis upon which to distinguish the previous case from 
the present one. This ability to confine prior cases to their facts 
allows courts to wiggle out of tight spots by deciding that “[t]his 
rule holds only for redheaded Walpoles in pale magenta Buick 
cars, [and thus has no application in the case at bar].”75 In 
 
convinced as they plunge the knife that they obey the bidding of their office. The victim 
is offered up to the gods of jurisprudence on the alter of regularity.” BENJAMIN 
CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 66 (1924). 
 72. One might argue that an absurd result in Riggs might easily be avoided by 
application of Clinton’s mischief rule. However, under Clinton’s taxonomy, the mischief 
rule is only activated when the statute is ambiguous on its face. Thus, since the plain 
meaning in this case was clear, the mischief rule has no direct application. Alterna-
tively, a finding that the statute in Riggs was ambiguous could only be arrived at by 
considering the underlying policy rationale for the statute. Allowing this would amount 
to a total abrogation of the plain-meaning rule, since the mischief rule would, in effect, 
be permitted to invoke itself by its own bootstraps. 
 73. That this was a question of policy rather than logic is supported by noting 
that, as a matter of logic, it would be untrue to say that the law “never permits a man 
to profit from wrongs he commits. In fact, people often profit, perfectly legally, from 
their legal wrongs. The most notorious case is adverse possession—if I trespass on your 
land long enough, some day I will gain a right to cross your land whenever I please.” 
Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 25 (1967), reprinted in 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14-80 (1978). Thus, the decision as to 
whether one should benefit from her wrongs depends on a choice of policy rather than 
one of pure logic. 
 74. Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190. 
 75. KARL LLEWELYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66-67 (3d 
ed. 1960). 
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other words, when referring to precedent, judges tend to take 
full advantage of Clinton’s notion that the dead are only “coun-
selors” rather than “rulers.”76 This ability of judges to manipu-
late past decisions by reading precedent broadly or narrowly 
limits the value of stare decisis as a tool for imposing judicial 
restraint. 
Once it is admitted, based upon the observations above, 
that the rules of interpretation (traditional or otherwise) and 
the principle of stare decisis are subject to “corrupt” applica-
tion,77 it becomes difficult to accept Clinton’s thesis that impos-
ing traditional rules of constitutional interpretation on the 
courts will significantly reduce the amount of judicial hegem-
ony in constitutional jurisprudence. Moreover, in light of the 
Supreme Court’s existing judicial freedom in choosing rules of 
interpretation, the imposition of traditional jurisprudential re-
straints on the Court is impossible, as a practical matter, since 
the implementation of such a plan would require the consen-
sual submission of the Court to such restraints (and thus, is a 
result of, rather than a remedy for, judicial freedom). 
C.  The Philosophical Underpinnings of Traditional 
Jurisprudence 
1.  Summary 
With respect to practical implications for constitutional ju-
risprudence, Clinton’s theory need not include the final two 
sections of God and Man in the Law. However, since most po-
litical theorists refuse to swallow the tautology that we should 
adhere to tradition simply because “that is the way we have 
always done it,” Clinton devotes the rest of his book to estab-
lishing an appropriate philosophical, epistemological, and 
metaphysical foundation for his theory of judicial restraint 
through the imposition of traditional rules of interpretation. 
In the fairness of conceding my scholarly weaknesses, I78 
 
 76. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 77. As Judge Richard Posner has pointed out, “[T]he irresponsible judge will 
twist any approach to yield the outcomes that he desires, and the stupid judge will do 
the same thing unconsciously.” RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND 
REFORM 286 (1985). 
 78. I apologize to the reader for this sudden shift in rhetorical style from third to 
first person; however, as I personally found the remainder of Clinton’s book largely in-
comprehensible, this shift in style may be read as a signal to the more “philosophically 
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must admit that I do not hold a Ph.D. in political philosophy. 
And since this seems to be a prerequisite to complete compre-
hension of the final sections of God and Man in the Law, cover-
age of these sections is limited in this Review. Nevertheless, I 
proceed—at least to a point. 
Clinton seems to argue that one of the most fundamental 
flaws in the philosophy of modern constitutional jurisprudence 
is its adoption of the view shared by Kant, Hume, Locke, and 
Berkeley that “ ‘ideas’ are the things which the mind thinks, 
not the things by which it thinks.”79 Clinton views this “flaw” as 
a basic, epistemological and metaphysical misconception. He 
contends that viewing ideas in this manner implies “the notion 
that we can be directly aware only of the contents of our indi-
vidual minds” and thus “there can be no direct experience of 
other individuals or of the contents of their minds.”80 This per-
ception results in a denial of human nature, since “[t]here can 
be no common reason and no rational basis for assuming even 
the existence of a common humanity.”81 In addition, this view 
leads to a skeptical conception of humanity as selfish, atom-
istic, and material, and denies the existence of anything that is 
transcendent—i.e., nonmaterial.82 In this manner, theorists 
such as John Austin “get rid of God . . . [by] simply defin[ing] 
him away”83 and replace God with man as the giver of “positive 
law.” 
Rejection of the transcendent leads to either a denial of the 
idea of natural law or results in a “truncated”84 version of natu-
ral law, based not on conventional morality which presupposes 
a transcendent order in the cosmos but on more “empirical,” 
materialistic conceptions of morality, such as the Social Dar-
winism of the Lochner era or the “Lifestyle Liberalism”85 which 
currently prevails. By contrast, Clinton urges the version of 
natural law developed by Thomas Aquinas, which divides law 
 
sophisticated” reader that for the remainder of this Review, my remarks are only “ob-
jective” to the extent of my comprehension. Beyond that, they represent only the sub-
jective reading experience of a reasonably intelligent, second-year law student. 
 79. See CLINTON, supra note 2, at 141. 
 80. Id. at 144. 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. at 133-39. 
 83. Id. at 156. 
 84. Id. at 146. 
 85. Id. at 75. Clinton uses this term to represent the privacy rights protected by 
the modern Court. 
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into four fields: eternal law, natural law, divine law, and hu-
man law.86 Eternal law is God’s government of the universe, 
which is inherent in things created.87 Natural law is the “im-
print of eternal law on rational creatures directing natural in-
clination to its proper end.”88 The imprint of eternal law is im-
perfect and thus must be supplemented by divine law, which is 
the “ordinance of grace due to sin.”89 Finally, human law is the 
equivalent of modern positive law.90 
Despite his affinity for Thomistic natural law, Clinton 
claims not only that the Supreme Court never has employed 
natural law, but that it cannot, and, even if it could, it should 
not apply natural law in deciding the constitutional issues 
which come before it.91 He specifically rejects the argument 
that the current protection of “fundamental rights” is a result 
of natural law analysis.92 Rather, Clinton claims that the fun-
damental rights analysis is based on a Millian-like “humanistic 
religion” which denies the natural law’s emphasis on the truly 
religious character of the law, the central role of the state in 
guardianship of public morality, and the importance of social 
status.93 This results in what Clinton labels “constitutional 
gnosticism,” which distorts the purposes of the establishment, 
speech and press, and equal protection clauses, removing God 
from constitutional jurisprudence and putting man in His 
place. 
2.  Critical response 
Though Clinton excoriates the warping of due process, 
equal protection, and establishment issues through modern 
constitutional analysis, he fails to make clear how his favored, 
Thomistic version of natural law would resolve the issues 
which have arisen in the constitutional adjudication of these 
clauses. More fundamentally, it is not even clear how Aquinas’s 
four types of law interact to produce the theory of legal inter-
 
 86. See id. at 152. 
 87. See id. 
 88. Id. (quoting THOMAS AQUINAS, TREATISE ON LAW (SUMMA THEOLOGICA, 
QUESTIONS 90-97) 14-16 (Stanley Parry ed., Regnery Gateway 1977). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See id. at 163. 
 92. See id. at 166-70. 
 93. See id. at 167. 
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pretation that Clinton seems to favor. 
Assuming that Clinton does in fact espouse some form of 
natural law jurisprudence, one of the perennial problems with 
espousing a natural law approach to constitutional interpreta-
tion is that it creates a “loose, flexible, uncontrolled standard 
for holding laws unconstitutional.”94 In other words, 
[t]he ideas of natural justice are regulated by no fixed stan-
dard: the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the 
subject; and all the Court could properly say, in such an 
event, would be, that the Legislature (possessed of an equal 
right of opinion) has passed an act which, in the opinion of the 
judges, was inconsistent with the abstract principles of natu-
ral justice. 95 
Despite Clinton’s argument that “Naturalism, properly under-
stood, . . . always counsels a healthy judicial restraint,”96 Clin-
ton fails to explain how the “counsel” of restraint is to be con-
verted into “actual” restraint. 
To confuse matters further, Clinton seems to conclude that 
natural law has not, and indeed should not, be applied by the 
Supreme Court in the area of constitutional adjudication.97 
This leaves readers in a quandary as to what theory of consti-
tutional interpretation Clinton proposes. From his earlier dis-
cussions, he presumably leans toward a Thomistic natural law 
foundation, but from his explicit rejection of the application of 
natural law, the reader is left wondering what Clinton would 
have the Court do. 
In short, while Clinton’s ruminations regarding the natural 
law-positive law controversy certainly produce a great deal of 
gobbledygook, it is unclear in the final analysis what result 
Clinton espouses. I will admit that the answer may lie some-
where between pages 131 and 170, but if it does, it is well hid-
den by the recondite rhetoric Clinton employs to develop it. The 
only thing that can be said with clarity is that, in Clinton’s 
view, God has been replaced by man in constitutional issues, 
and, in the same manner in which the wings of the Australian 
 
 94. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 521 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
 95. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J.). Although Clinton 
claims that the Court was not actually employing a natural law analysis in either Cal-
der or (presumably) Griswold, he provides no basis for not subjecting his version of 
natural law analysis to the same criticism. 
 96. CLINTON,  supra note 2, at 149. 
 97. See supra Part II.C.1. 
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butterfly cause the rainstorm in North America, this is some-
how a result of the conception of ideas as objects of thought 
rather than tools of thought. Go figure. 
D.  Constitutional Gnosticism and Constitutional Theism 
The final portion of God and Man in the Law (like the pre-
vious portions) is prefaced by a short introduction in which 
Clinton raises the reader’s hopes of comprehending the text by 
stating, “[B]efore going any further, [it might be advantageous] 
to catch a breath by way of summarizing some of the ideas that 
have already been introduced.”98 I must admit that I was elated 
at the prospect of a concise, comprehensible summary of the 
erudite, metaphysical quagmire through which I had, some-
what unsuccessfully, trudged. My reprieve was short-lived, 
however, as Clinton’s summary proved equally unintelligible. I 
quote the beginning of Clinton’s summary at length, not only to 
express my personal awe at how much can be said and so little 
understood, but to allow the reader to whom this makes 
sense—and you know who you are—to disregard my commen-
tary and give this portion of the book his or her own fair shake: 
[M]odern thought holds fast to a restrictive view of reason 
that effectively eliminates the idea of the mind as an organ 
providing direct access to an intelligible reality. This perspec-
tive has led to a conception of the mind as an organ whose 
task is merely to process sense data by the application of logi-
cal or mathematical functions. Commensurate with the em-
piricist assumption that ideas are the very things we think 
and not merely the vehicles of our thoughts, modern reason is 
denied access to things in themselves (“things as such,” or 
“things as they are”) through its denial of any necessary con-
nection between thought and its objects. We are led to the po-
sition described by Bertrand Russell in The Principles of Pure 
Mathematics: 
When actual objects are counted, or when geometry or 
dynamics are applied to actual space or actual matter, or 
when, in any other way, mathematical reasoning is ap-
plied to what exists, the reasoning employed has a form 
not dependent upon the objects that they are, but only 
upon their having certain general properties. . . . Thus 
when space or motion is spoken of in pure mathematics, it 
 
 98. CLINTON, supra note 2, at 171. 
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is not actual space or actual motion, as we know them in 
experience, that are spoken of, but any entity possessing 
those abstract general properties of space or motion that 
are employed in the reasonings of geometry or dynamics. 
The question whether these properties belong, as a matter 
of fact, to actual space or actual motion, is irrelevant to 
pure mathematics, and therefore to the present work, be-
ing, in my opinion, a purely empirical question, to be in-
vestigated in the laboratory of the observatory. [citation 
omitted]. 
The divorce of objects “just as they are” (and just as they are 
experienced) from their “abstract general properties” leads 
straightforwardly to an epistemological skepticism that de-
nies the possibility of discovering objective truth in the cos-
mos and ultimately to a metaphysical nihilism that denies the 
very existence of any external reality apart from that which is 
accessible through sense perception. 99 
Well, there you have it. Multiply this by ten; repeat the 
words “constitution” and “judicial supremacy” three times; 
throw in a few phrases that include the expressions “noume-
nal,” “immanentize,” “metaxy,” and “antinomy”; mix well with 
the first dozen five-syllable words ending in “-ism” that come to 
mind; and “voilà,” the politico-philosophical, metaphysical, 
epistemological, teleological, ontological, and theological foun-
dations of Clinton’s theory emerge. 
With that kind of introduction, I presume that the reader of 
this Review will come to one of two conclusions: (1) she will 
agree that Clinton’s editors should have returned his manu-
script to him and demanded that he rewrite it in the English 
language, or (2) she will dismiss my criticism as the unlearned 
ejaculations of an ignorant student. And while the true answer 
probably lies somewhere in between these two extremes, both 
sides would likely agree that it is best at this point to proceed 
quickly to the conclusions which relate to the practical implica-
tions of Clinton’s theory and leave the niceties of Clinton’s 
metaphysics to those who have more time and patience, and 
who have breakfasted on enough metaphysical Wheaties to 
send in for the magical philosophical secret decoder ring. 
 
 99. Id. at 171-72. 
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III.  CONCLUSION 
Whatever the metaphysical, epistemological, etc.-ical basis 
for Clinton’s proposal to constrain judicial decisionmaking in 
the constitutional arena by limiting judicial freedom, Clinton’s 
approach fails for the more fundamental reason that, as a prac-
tical matter, it will not work. While reliance on common law 
traditions may provide sufficient interpretive tools for constitu-
tional provisions which clearly may be shown to have tradi-
tional common law antecedents, such an analysis may be inap-
propriate (or impossible) for constitutional provisions that 
cannot clearly be shown to emanate from the common law. Fur-
thermore, there is no guarantee that, even if implemented, the 
traditional rules of interpretation (i.e., the plain-meaning, mis-
chief, and golden rules, and the principle of stare decisis) would 
act as an effective restraint against judicial supremacy. Fi-
nally, even if such traditional rules were to be consistently ap-
plied as a constraining force, the constraint would necessarily 
be self-imposed. Thus, adopting Clinton’s traditional jurispru-
dence would not deprive the Court of judicial freedom, but 
rather would be an affirmative act of judicial freedom, and 
thus, paradoxically, would actually result in a perpetuation of 
judicial supremacy. 
As Clinton admits,100 God and Man in the Law is the “al-
ternative” argument to his earlier theory for dethroning the ju-
dicial monarchy in Marbury v. Madison and Judicial Review, 
which in my view, presents a much more compelling solution to 
the problem of judicial supremacy. In the spirit of alternative 
pleading, God and Man in the Law effectively illustrates what 
any competent lawyer knows: There is a good reason why al-
ternative arguments find their way to the back of judicial 
briefs.101 
David D. Garner 
 
 100. See id. at 54-55. 
 101. For the concluding statement, the reviewer wishes to acknowledge Cory Tal-
bot, whose quick wit was the genesis of the thought expressed. 
